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A common fraud by registered traders in the value-added tax system is under-reporting sales
and over-reporting purchases. This paper models this problem by linking the level of misreporting
to the risk-aversion of taxpayers and the level of transactions with final consumers. In addition,
it analyses the enforcement consequences of the new developments in information reporting and
electronic invoicing, which enable the tax authority to randomly cross-check the invoices. The
results highlight the importance of taxpayer’s subjective beliefs in shaping audit policy of the tax
authority. The optimal audit rate for risk-neutral firms is an increasing function of transaction
with final consumers, but this relationship may turn to be negative for risk-averse taxpayers.
Moreover, the optimal level of invoice cross-checking on transactions of each commodity is posi-
tively associated with the number of trading firms.
Keywords: Value-added tax, Tax evasion, Information reporting, Predictive analytics
JEL code: H26
1 Introduction
One of the most important concerns of tax administration is choosing a simple and efficient enforce-
ment procedure to reduce the risk of tax fraud and evasion. The value-added tax (VAT) is nowadays
the preferred form of indirect tax and is believed to facilitate enforcement through its invoicing
system. For tax authorities, each VAT invoice generates a piece of information on a transaction,
verifiable in case of inter-firm trade with the corresponding invoice issued by the other party. This
type of third-party reporting in the VAT increases the risk of hiding transactions for firms and thus
reduces evasion (Pomeranz, 2013). However, this deterrence mechanism breaks down in transactions
with final consumers who do not report the invoice to the government. Consequently, an approach
to identify the VAT evasion potential among different taxpayers becomes critical for tax authorities.
On the other hand, modern VAT systems involve extensive information reporting to achieve a high
level of compliance at a modest cost, but the consequences of such transition is almost neglected in
the tax evasion literature. This paper analyzes firm’s behavior to evade the VAT and the optimal
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advisor, Jan Boone, for invaluable guidance and numerous suggestions. I also wish to thank Thorsten Beck, Benedikt
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strategy of the authority in this respect by linking noncompliance with the level of final consumption
and risk-aversion of each taxpayers. In addition, it studies the role information reporting, which
enables the tax authority to cross-check the VAT invoices, on firm’s VAT evasion and discusses its
efficient implementation.
Broadly, VAT evasion can be classified into two forms. At the intensive margin, a registered seller
gains from under-reporting the sale, while a formal buyer benefits from over-reporting its purchase.
I use the generic term misreporting to refer to noncompliance by registered traders. In comparison,
informality represents the extensive margin, i.e. evasion by firms working in the shadow economy
and failing to register with tax agencies. In the high-income countries, the loss in VAT revenue due
to misreporting is much larger than failure to register. For instance, in 2001-02, non-compliance by
registered traders in UK resulted in loss of £6.7-9.75 billion compared to £400-500 million loss from
traders not registering for the VAT (Keen and Smith, 2006). However, in developing countries both
frauds seems to be extensive, where according to Schneider et al. (2011) the informal sector comprises
around 40% of GDP on average (ranging up to 70%). The extensive margin of VAT evasion is studied
in Hoseini (2014) in detail, and the focus of this paper is on modeling misreporting problem in the
VAT system and how the government can reduce it.
Figure 1 illustrates VAT collection efficiency defined as VATrevenue/(VAT rate×Value-Added)
versus the share of final consumption in total sales among different activities in UK, where the bulk
of loss in the VAT collection is due to misreporting fraud.1 Unlike business-to-business transactions,
no third-party reported invoice exists in business-to-household sales and thus they are less risky
for VAT misreporting. The figure justifies this by showing a negative relationship between the two
variables in the sense that sectors with more inter-firm transactions (fewer sales to final consumers)
have more VAT collection efficiency. In this paper, I pinpoint how the difference in the risk of
misreporting affects the optimal enforcement policy of the government.
The model of the paper is based on the standard theoretical model for analyzing tax evasion. The
tax authority seeks to minimize VAT evasion given the tax base and the cost of audit. The tax base is
composed of firms heterogeneous in VAT obligation, risk-aversion and the type of customers. There
are two enforcement instruments available for the authority: (i) audit staff visit the enterprise and
check the transactions (visiting audit); (ii) a number of reported business-to-business transactions are
cross-checked for correspondence with the other party (random invoice cross-checking). The second
1According to UK National Audit Office (2004) and UK Government (2013), around one third of firms in UK under-
declare their VAT obligation resulting around 8-10% loss in the government revenue and this number is a significant
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Figure 1: VAT collection efficiency ratio and final consumption share among different UK activities (2006-07). For
data details see Appendix B.
enforcement method is much easier for the authority, but it is limited to inter-firm transactions and
needs infrastructure on information reporting.
The results of the model intuitively imply that the optimal visiting audit rate negatively depends
on the taxpayer’s risk-aversion with respect to tax evasion gamble. However, the relationship between
optimal visiting audit rate and the level of final consumption of a firm is more complicated. Since
transactions with final consumers are unverifiable, on the one hand, they persuade firms to evade
more, on the other hand, they reduce the expected return of a visiting audit. For a risk-neutral
taxpayer, the optimal audit rate is an increasing function of sales to final consumers. In comparison,
more unverifiable transactions does not sharply change the evasion of a risk-averse taxpayer, but it
makes the detection of the fraud harder. As a result, for a very risk-averse taxpayer, the optimal audit
rate is first increasing but after some point decreasing in sales to final consumers. In practice, large
enterprises are more risk-averse and unlikely to engage in gross evasion, such as making uninvoiced
transactions. Among other reasons, their accounting systems would not permit this and having
numerous employees makes their collusion to unreport tax fragile (Kleven et al., 2009; Tait, 1991).
Therefore, VAT collections improves if audit is directed to medium and small enterprises which are
more risky taxpayers. This result is at odds with the conventional perception in many countries that
the audit should primarily be devoted to larger taxpayers having higher additional tax assessment per
visiting audit. In addition, the model show the optimal invoice cross-checking rate among different
commodities is positively associated with the number of firms in the market of that commodity. If
the cross-checking policy is not chosen optimally, it motivates firms to shift their misreporting to the
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commodity that generates the lowest risk.
This paper contributes to several aspects of tax enforcement literature. Most studies about the
optimal design of the VAT presume that it is collected costlessly, however, VAT evasion may create
a critical impact on its optimality versus other taxes like tariff (Emran and Stiglitz, 2005). To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first paper modeling VAT misreporting with an important policy
implications for tax authorities in both developed and developing countries.
Despite the limited research on the VAT specific aspects of tax enforcement, the broad concept
of tax compliance has attracted a lot of attention in the literature. As a general classification,
Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014) categorize tax evasion models based on their assumption about ethical
factors, though the two groups are not mutually exclusive. The ‘deterrence’ models presume the
actions of taxpayers are not set by morality or social norms, but are based on the possibility of
audit and punishment. This branch of literature can be traced back to the seminal formulation
of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), assuming that, to understate their income, risk-averse taxpayers
are constrained by a possible penalty and the expected payoff determines the level of evasion. In
comparison, ‘non-deterrence’ models focus on the behavioral aspects of tax evasion arguing that
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) cannot fully explain the compliance rates, especially in the developed
world (for a survey see Hashimzade et al., 2013). This growing branch of the literature mainly studies
the effect of social norms and ethical parameters such as regret, shame, or delight at cheating on the
behavior of taxpayers. Andreoni et al. (1998) indicate that, by tax evasion, people may fear social
stigma or damage to reputation suggesting that factors such as a moral obligation to be truthful,
or the social consequences of being a known cheater, may add further compliance incentives that
are not accounted for in the standard models. In the paper, using a simple deterrence framework, I
explain how the subjective beliefs of a taxpayer are reflected in his cost function and analyze their
role in shaping the optimal audit policy.
The paper also contributes to the literature emphasizing the importance of different forms of
third party reporting in the tax enforcement. Johns and Slemrod (2010) show that in the U.S., only
1 percent of wages and salaries is misreported, but in a sharp contrast, an estimated 57 percent
of self-employment business income, which is based on self-assessment, is not reported. In a field
experiment on the individual income tax in Denmark, Kleven et al. (2011) show that income tax
evasion is low, except for the fraction that is self-reported. Directly relevant to this paper, Pomeranz
(2013) uses a randomized experiment on Chilean firms to investigate the effect of the third party
reported paper trails in the VAT on the tax compliance. She shows that in transactions with final
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consumers, in which the VAT paper trail is absent, the response of firms to an audit letter message
is stronger, consistent with the stylized fact provided in Figure 1.
The results of the paper also add to the recent and growing literature investigating the effect of
new developments in information reporting systems on tax compliance. As a general definition, infor-
mation reporting are the requirements that certain transactions causing tax obligation be reported
by the third party to the tax authority (Shaw et al., 2010). By adding information reporting into
the standard tax enforcement framework, Paramonova (2014) models how tax authority can affect
the accuracy of information about taxpayers and determines the optimal tax audit rule for a given
information accuracy. This paper also models the consequence of information reporting system, but
in a VAT setting, and characterizes the optimal way of using such a system.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on predictive analytics and subjective audits in
tax enforcement. In the deterrence models, the audit is usually assumed to be random; however, the
majority of audits conducted in practice are risk-based and not completely random. Some papers
model the optimal audit strategy as a function of reported income and the dynamics of taxpayer’s
behavior (e.g. Andreoni et al., 1998; Reinganum and Wilde, 1985). Another important factor
determining tax fraud is taxpayer’s risk attitude. The effect of risk aversion on tax evasion is traced
back to Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who predict, ceteris paribus, risk-averse individuals evade
less than others. Considering all of these factors, some papers suggest simulation-based approaches
to predict the compliance incentive of each taxpayer, and consequently, its optimal audit rate (e.g.
Engel and Hines Jr, 1999; Hashimzade et al., 2014). Analyzing the risk of taxpayers, helps overcome
the asymmetric information problem the tax authority faces, and I assume using predictive analytics
methods, the authority clusters the firms based on their risk-aversion and final consumption. The
results of model show that such analysis increases collection efficiency and is an essential element of
optimal VAT enforcement.
After this introduction, this paper provides some empirical evidence using two datasets from
manufacturing sector of India and examines the factors explaining VAT misreporting. The findings
indicate that the chance of VAT misreporting of a commodity is increasing in its final consumption,
number of traders, and the size of producers. Next, in section 3, I explain the practical VAT
enforcement issues and model the behavior of a single firm when it decides between misreporting the
transactions with other firms and final consumers. Sections 4 and 5, respectively, study the optimal
policies in the presence and absence of an information reporting system which enables the authority
to perform random invoice cross-checking. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Preliminary evidence
The previous evidence suggests a negative relationship between final consumption and VAT compli-
ance of a sector. Tait (1991) indicates that the mark up ratio of the VAT, defined as reported sales
divided by reported purchases in a period, is less in retail and wholesale sectors. In a randomized
experiment, Pomeranz (2013) observes that firms respond more to an increase in audit probability
on transactions with final consumers, where there is no paper trail, suggesting more ex-ante evasion
on these transactions. In this part, I provide some evidence about the effect of final consumption
of a commodity on its VAT misreporting from India. According to Hoseini (2014), among Indian
small services sector enterprises that are above VAT registration threshold, just about 12% are reg-
istered with tax authorities between 2001 and 2006, suggesting high informality rate. Moreover, the
below estimation shows around 31% VAT misreporting among manufacturing units. Therefore, as a
developing country, both informality and misreporting are high in Indian VAT system.
The data used in the paper is from the manufacturing sector of India in 2005-06, given the two rich
surveys conducted then by the Ministry of Statistic and Programme Implementation, Government
of India. The main data is drawn from Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) by Industrial Statistic
Wing of Central Statistical Office. This survey contains the representative sample of 37,055 formal
manufacturing establishments with more than 10 employees and has detailed information on various
aspects of firms’ activities. The second data source is an enterprise survey by National Sample
Survey office (NSS) which includes a representative sample of 80,637 small manufacturing units that
are not covered by ASI. In both dataset, proper weight showing how many enterprises the sample
represents is provided.2 In the ASI, the firm-level information about the details of quantity, value
of sales, and excise duties of each product and by-product is available. This information enables us
to measure tax evasion by the level of underpaying the tax obligation on sales. Nevertheless, the
statistical agency is not authorized to reveal the identity of the enterprise.3
There are two types of indirect taxes on manufacturing establishments in India: Excise duty by
the central government and sales tax by state governments. In this paper, I just focus on excise duties
to avoid state level differences in tax rates and VAT adoption. In India, excise duties (Cent-VAT)
are levied on all manufacturing products with the same ad-valorem rate per commodity all over the
2The data description and the questionnaires are available online at micro data archive of MOSPI http://mail.
mospi.gov.in/.
3In general, measuring evasion and misreporting is not simple since firms are reluctant to give such information.
Nevertheless, ASI is conducted independent of tax purposes and no information about the identity of the enterprise is
supposed to go to the other agencies. As it mentioned in the manual of ASI, according to the Collection of Statistics
Act, violation of any of the confidentiality and secrecy of the information by statistics officer or field staff is prosecuted
by or with the consent of appropriate agency.
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country. In addition, under central VAT system, the assessee himself determines the duty liability on
the goods and clears the goods, thus the audit method is self-assessment without invoice reporting.
In order to measure misreporting per commodity, in the first step, we need the tax rates. The
rate of excise duties is changing across commodities and overtime and unfortunately there is no
reliable information about it. To overcome this, instead of de jure tax rate –which may not be
immediately applied and be complied by firms– I measure the de facto rate by finding the mode of
the rate paid by firms in ASI, after dropping the zero payments.4 Having tax rate per commodity, the
overall misreporting in manufacturing sector can be estimated by the average of excise evasion/(tax
rate×production), weighted by the level of production, which equals 31.1%.
For testing the effect of commodity characteristics on its tax underreporting, we also need reliable
data on the intermediate and final consumption and also the number of sellers and buyers. Both
ASI and NSS have commodity-level information about the input materials and outputs of each firm
including quantity, value, unit and the commodity 5-digit code. I estimate the measures by combining
and aggregating the data using sample weights. First, I compute the sum of sales and purchases
of each commodity by manufacturing firms as well as the number of its sellers and buyers. Next, I
estimate two indexes for final consumption of each commodity as5
final consumption per firm = log
(
1 +
total sales− purchases by other firms
total number of sellers
)
(1)
final consumption share = log
(
1 +




Regarding VAT underreporting, first I compute the overall excise payment and sales of each com-
modity in ASI, and then I construct two measures:
evasion per firm = log(
tax rate× value of sales− excise payment
total number of sellers
) (3)
evasion to tax base = log(
tax rate× value of sales− excise payment
tax rate× value of sales
) (4)
Table 1 shows the standardized coefficients of OLS estimation of evasion on commodity charac-
teristics. The unit of observation is commodity and to control for the similarity between different
4If the hypothesis of less compliance of sectors with high final consumption is true, we expect to observe lower de
facto rate in those sectors. Therefore, the estimations are likely to underestimate the effect of final consumption on
misreporting.
5If the purchases are higher than the sales, I assume the product is completely used as intermediate input and the
difference is provided by imports. That is the reason of adding 1 in the logarithm. Unfortunately, I do not find any
corresponding commodity-level import and export tables of India in 2005-06 to take them into account.
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goods, I cluster the standard errors at 2-digit Indian ASICC commodity code. The results indicate
that both absolute and relative evasions are positively affected by final consumption share of the
commodity. One standard deviation increase in the commodity’s final consumption per firm increases
evasion per firm and evasion to tax base by 3.9 and 7.9 percent respectively. These numbers are 2.6
and 5.7 percent for the effect of final consumption share. In addition, more sellers and buyers both
significantly increase evasion of a commodity, which can reflect the higher, the number of units in
a sector, the lower, the chance of audit and the risk of detection. The average production per firm
increases evasion of the commodity too, but it is a concave function since the square term has a nega-
tive coefficient. This is consistent with Tait (1991) who indicates although misreporting is positively
associated with the size, but larger taxpayers do not violate VAT proportional to their production
and marginal evasion is decreasing in firm size. In other words, the degree of risk-aversion with
respect to tax evasion is positively associated with the firm’s size such that evasion of big firms, in
relative terms, is smaller than small firms. Finally, while the effect of tax rate on absolute evasion is
positive, it is negatively associated with relative evasion. One simple explanation is that, in addition
to misreporting, higher tax rate increases total tax base –the numerator of the relative index– and
thus has two opposing effects in the latter case.
evasion per firm evasion to tax base
(1) (2) (3) (4)
final consumption per firm 0.039∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(4.46) (4.32)
final consumption share 0.026∗∗ 0.057∗∗
(2.41) (2.55)
log of number of sellers 0.103∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(5.07) (5.21) (6.08) (6.13)
log of number of buyers 0.030∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.66) (3.32) (2.94)
log of production per firm 1.117∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗
(19.26) (18.76) (4.07) (4.06)
squared log of production per firm -0.205∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.506∗∗∗ -0.507∗∗∗
(-3.94) (-3.83) (-4.15) (-4.05)
rate of excise duties 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗
(8.39) (8.42) (-5.91) (-5.87)
observations 2379 2379 2379 2379
Table 1: The effect of commodity characteristics on its overall misreporting –The unit of observation is
commodity. Standardized coefficients and t statistics (in parentheses) are reported. Standard errors are clustered at
2-digit commodity code. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Given the preliminary evidences, I move forward in three steps. First, I present some background
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information about the practical issues of VAT audit which lays the foundation of the model. Then
I model firm’s behavior and government policy when random cross-checking is possible. Afterwards,
I extend the model to a case that there is no possibility of cross-checking to see how it affects the
outcomes.
3 VAT audit in practice and the basis of the model
In this part, I describe the key aspect of VAT administration in different countries and then base
them to characterize the theoretical model. In a VAT system, firms are required to charge tax on
their output and in return deduct taxes paid on inputs from their VAT bill. The input credit is given
against VAT payment as a refund and thus just VAT-payers can obtain it. The implementation
of VAT in almost all countries, except Japan6, is based on invoice-credit form, which is the focus
throughout the paper. In this method, registered sellers issue an invoice corresponding to the VAT
charged on sales to each customer, who if registered, can use the invoice to get refund on inputs. Like
any other tax, VAT is vulnerable to evasion and the governments must choose an auditing strategy.
According to Ebrill et al. (2001), in general, there are three audit methods for the VAT:
Simple self-assessment without invoice reporting– Each enterprise calculates its own tax liability
(usually per month or quarter) and sends the aggregate tax return forms to the authority. It does
not have to send the invoices, but has to keep them for some years and is subject to a possible audit
by the tax authority. During the audit, the authority checks the book of accounts and extensively
cross-checks all of the invoices with the corresponding reports of the firm’s suppliers and business
clients. The auditors also use other possible information like bank accounts to find out the violation
in other transactions. In 2001, around half of countries with the VAT apply this method of VAT
administration (Ebrill et al., 2001).
Self-assessment with invoice reporting– Firms calculate their own tax liability, but also send
additional documents such as invoices to the tax authority. The authority then can audit the firm
in person or just by cross-checking the invoices. This method is applied in many countries and is
growing because of the new developments in information technology.
Direct government audit– The taxpayer files a return in the tax office, then the authorities audit
and assess the tax obligation of the firm. The method is not common nowadays and broadly was
conducted in 1990s in some former Soviet Union states.
6In Japan, each trader is taxed on the difference between sales and purchases.
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There is a trade-off between enforcement method and compliance cost of taxpayers. The advo-
cates of the first method argue that it has the least compliance cost and is more efficient. Ebrill
et al. (2001) indicate that self-assessment procedures with complex requirements place excessive
compliance costs on taxpayers and can be a serious impediment to detection of delinquent taxpay-
ers. Without invoice reporting, however, cross-checking is not possible. The early attempt of heavy
cross-checking was done in South-Korea in 1980s. Overall, it was unsuccessful due to complexity of
the work and the lack of IT technology. At the same time, some countries like Bolivia and Chile
conducted cross-checking on a random basis, but the processes were done manually by tax audit-
ing staff and was very time-consuming (Tait, 1991). Nevertheless, the development of information
technology nowadays has increased tax enforcement performance considerably and e-auditing is now
growing all over the world. With the assistance of electronic invoicing and data mining –a methodol-
ogy to identify specific information from rough data via computing technology– tax authorities can
collect the third party information much easier to perform data matching and finding evasion cases
(Wu et al., 2012). Currently, many countries7 are adopting integrated electronic invoicing system
which enables the government to randomly cross-check the invoices. Dealing with the huge volume
of invoices might be impossible and even if the list of all unmatched transactions is available by
data mining methods, identifying the fraudulent party –seller or buyer– and the arrangements of
proper penalty need auditing staff. Therefore, in reality, tax authorities are able to investigate a
fraction of the suspicious transactions for further auditing because of limited staff resources and have
to prioritize between different commodities or sectors. Nevertheless, if such a system is developed,
its variable cost for cross-checking a firm is much less than the cost of a visiting audit for the tax
authority.
In any types of assessment, if a fraud is detected, the fraudulent firm has to pay the misreported
tax plus an extra penalty. Tait (1991) indicates that when a taxpayer misreports a small amount,
the purpose of the penalty is to dissuade him so that he does not repeat the violation. But when
the fraud goes beyond the violation and falls into the realm of crime, harsh penalties, including jail
sentences, may apply. In practice, the level of penalty is different across countries. For instance,
in UK it is changing from 20% to 100% of the fraud based on its magnitude. In some countries
the fraudulent has to pay from 2 to 10 times of the misreported tax (like Argentina and Bolivia).
Nevertheless, almost in all countries large scale frauds leads to closing of the business and also years
of imprisonment. Hence, in practice the penalty is an increasing and convex function of the level of
7some examples are Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, Poland and South Korea.
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evasion.
3.1 The basic assumptions of the model
In order to model misreporting and optimal enforcement in the VAT, I follow the standard model of
tax evasion and extend it by differentiating between two types of transactions. Consider an economy
comprising firms heterogeneous in risk-aversion and type and level of tax obligation. Based on the
type of activity, each firm makes two types of transactions: with other formal businesses (b), with
final consumers (c), imposing yb and yc as the VAT obligation. As a result, each firm decides about
two types of evasion eb and ec based on the nature of the obligation. The difference between b and
c comes from their transparency to the tax authority. The authority can realize the exact amount
of yb –and thus eb– by cross-checking the invoices, but yc has no corresponding third-party reported
information and small amount of ec may be unrealizable. Detection of ec is possible only by visiting
audits when the authority checks information such as bank accounts, total turnover, size, location
etc. The probability that the audit detects ec depends on the relative extent of the fraud. If the
evasion comprises a very small fraction of the tax obligation, the detection would be very hard,
but the probability increases when the relative extent of fraud increases. Therefore, I assume the
probability that the authority detects the fraud on sale to final consumers in a visiting audit is ec/yc.
There are two enforcement methods for the tax authority. The first one involves random cross-
checking and needs infrastructure on information reporting. The second one is self-assessment with-
out invoice reporting. In the first method, the authority has two separate tools for each type of
evasion. It randomly cross-checks a share of inter-firm transactions to detect eb, but ec can be de-
tected only by visiting audit. In the simple self-assessment system, no random invoice cross-checking
is possible and if a visiting audit takes place, the auditors thoroughly checks all VAT invoices for
correspondence, as well as other information for estimating yc. As a results, the fraud in transactions
with formal firms (eb) is for certain detected, but the probability that the authority detects the fraud
on sale to final consumers is ec/yc.
If a fraud is detected, a penalty is applied by the authority which is always greater than the
amount of evasion. If the detected evasion is near zero the penalty approaches to the principal of
unpaid obligation. Based on the facts explained above, I assume θ(e), an increasing and convex
function of the detected evasion e with the following characteristics, determines the cost of fraud for
the firm:
θ(0) ≥ 0, and ∀e > 0 : θ(e) > 0, θ′(e) > 1, θ′′(e) > 0, θ′′′(e) ≥ 0 (5)
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These assumptions about the cost of detection just reflect the financial costs for a risk-neutral
taxpayer. In practice, other factors like risk aversion and social norms can increase the convexity of
cost function for some taxpayers. In below, I take these measures into account when discussing the
optimal visiting audit policy. Prior to that, the results does not depend on the functional form of
θ(e).
In this paper, although the decision of firm for evasion (ec and eb) depends on the enforcement
strategy of the tax authority, production and tax obligation yb and yc are held fixed. This is the com-
mon assumption in models for analysis of tax evasion, like the seminal formulation of Allingham and
Sandmo (1972) which has been the dominating theoretical model in this literature. This assumption
is specially plausible for the VAT evasion, since the VAT is essentially a tax on final consumption
and it does not distort the profit maximization of firms. Hence, one can reasonably assume that
the decisions about production and VAT evasion are orthogonal. Besides, the aim of this paper is
characterizing the optimal audit strategy for the tax authority and the determinants of the tax base
is not the subject of discussion.8 In order to find the optimal visiting audit policy, the paper seeks
to find the audit rate as a function of the estimated tax obligation on sales to final consumers and
risk-aversion of the firm. Moreover, as it will be discussed in section 4.1.1, the optimal policy for
invoice cross-checking is independent of tax obligation and depends on the number of firms in the
economy.
In the following, for better mathematical tractability, I first analyze the firm’s decision and the
optimal policy, when an invoice cross-checking system is available for the tax authority, and then
study the model in the absence of such system (simple self-assessment).
4 The model with random invoice cross-checking
In this part, I model the consequences of having an integrated invoice system that enables the
government for random cross-checking. As mentioned above, such a system is now more feasible
with the advancements in information technology and is growing all over the world. In general,
there are two types of invoices in the VAT system: (1) sale invoice shows the tax payment by the
seller, (2) purchase invoice is used by the buyer to get credit on inputs. Sales can be understated
in the form of not reporting a number of sale invoices by the seller, in comparison the buyer can
8Minimizing evasion per se is an important objective from normative point of view, since it reduces the tax inequality
between compliant and non-compliant taxpayers. Moreover, unequal tax burden intensifies tax distortion at the
aggregate level.
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create some fake purchase invoices to overstate the credit due on its input. Therefore, when the
government accumulates all reported invoices in one place, some sale invoices are missing and some
extra purchase invoices are generated by the buyers. For performing cross-checking, after random
selection of n purchase invoices, the government cross-checks them with the corresponding sale
invoice. The number n is a policy variable determined by the cost of cross-checking and total
number of purchase invoices N in the economy. The government seeks to find the optimal allocation
of n across different intermediate goods.
The strategy of the tax authority after drawing and cross-checking n purchase invoices is finding
the firms that made the violation. I assume, after detection of a violation, the authority cross-checks
all other invoices of the suspicious firm, reimburses the principal tax, and charges an extra penalty.
I also assume that, in a firm’s view, invoice cross-checking is conducted independent of visiting
audits and it optimizes the evasion on inter-business transactions eb and final consumer sales ec in
two separate problems. This assumption enables me to find the analytic solutions of eb and ec by
separating the effects of the two enforcement tools. In Appendix A.1, I relax this assumption by
assuming the two types of evasion are jointly determined in one optimizations problem and show
that in practical circumstances the two problems become very similar.
Before analyzing the general random invoice cross-checking problem, I study a simple market
of one intermediate good in which an upstream sector u sells the good to one downstream sector
d. The optimization problem of a single firm in sector u (d) is how many sale (purchase) invoices
to misreport given the risk of government detection. Each invoice represents a unit of transaction
with value α based on the type of the intermediate good.9 If a firm misreports k invoices of the
intermediate good, its evasion in this market will be eb = αk, and the probability that no misreported
invoice is cross-checked becomes (1− k/N)n where, N and n are the total number and the number
of cross-checked invoices in market of the intermediate good. In practice, the number of reported
invoices in a market is so large that a single firm cannot change it and takes it as given,10 therefore I
assume that k << N and thus k/N ≈ 0. As a result, we can use first order approximation and write
(1− k/N)n = 1− kn/N , which means that the probability of detection of at least one misreported
invoice by the government and getting fined is kn/N , where k = eb/α. Then, the optimization
9α shows the average value of one invoice of the good. This assumption is made to distinguish between commodities
with high value per unit (e.g. Steel bar) and others (e.g. bread).
10For instance, around 26 billion VAT invoices are reported in Germany in 2006 (Baldwin, 2007).
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where µ = n/N is the share of invoices that are cross-checked by the government and the second term






Because θ is a strictly increasing and convex function, one can easily show that eb decreases when n/N
goes up. Therefore, when the authority cross-checks a larger share of invoices, inter-firm misreporting
reduces.
On the other hand, the authority conducts visiting audits aiming at detection of evasion on
unverifiable transactions yc. As a consequence, the firm faces another optimization problem on ec







where λ stands for the share of firms that are randomly audited by the tax authority and ec/yc is







Proposition 1. In the presence of invoice cross-checking, total evasion eb + ec is decreasing in
visiting audit rate λ and invoice cross-checking rate µ and increasing in VAT obligation on final
consumption yc.
Proof. Appendix A.2.
Proposition 1 indicates that if the government utilizes the cross-checking technology there is
a negative relationship between final consumption and VAT compliance. Moreover, total evasion
is decreasing in visiting audit and cross-checking rates. In the next step, I discuss the optimal
enforcement policy for cross-checking and visiting audits.
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4.1 Optimal enforcement
Assume we have an economy with heterogeneous firms and I intermediate goods. The tax authority
is not fully informed about the heterogeneity of the firm, but using predictive analytics can categorize
them into S different clusters based on the type of activity, the estimated amount of VAT obligation,
and risk-aversion.11 Each intermediate good is produced by one activity and is used as an input by
a number of activities. The policy vector of the government includes µi = ni/Ni which is the ratio of
transactions of each commodity i to be cross-checked and λs which is the audit rate in each cluster
s. The aim of this section is finding the optimal allocation of µi and λs across commodities and
clusters based on aggregate and firm-level factors. In the following, first I find the optimal policy
for the cross-checking rate µi, then explain the role of subjective measures in evasion and determine
the optimal visiting audit rate.
4.1.1 Optimal invoice cross-checking
One of the policy instruments of the government is the cross-checking share for each commodity. With
the advanced information reporting system, the government receives the invoice of each transaction
and decides on the share of input credit invoices of each intermediate good to be drawn for cross-
checking (µi). In this case, the policy maker’s question is finding the optimal allocation of µ1, . . . , µI .
If the number of sellers and buyers of intermediate good i are M iu and M
i
d and the buyers have no








b + δµiNi (10)
where δ is the variable cost of cross-checking one invoice and finding its violating firm, N̄i is the
real number of firm-to-firm transaction invoices, and Ni = N̄i + Mdki is total number of purchase
invoices.



















11The factors to help predict the heterogeneity are discussed in section 4.1.3.
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Proposition 2 states the condition for optimal cross-checking rate of a commodity, when the
number of traders and invoices are known. Because all firms trading the commodity i have the
same chance of getting caught, and in case of detection of one misreported invoice, all verifiable
transactions are cross-checked, the incentive for misreporting is the same among them. Therefore,
the higher the number of firms, the more the overall misreporting. In addition, if the variable cost
of cross-checking δ diminishes by new technologies, the audit rate can be estimated by (11). This
estimation is independent of the form of cost function, because small δ results in small eb, and near
zero θ(eb) ≈ eb. If δ becomes very small, then the optimal decision of the government is cross-checking
all transactions of the commodity i.
In the model, the upstream firms produce just one product and their misreporting is limited
to invoices of good i, but in (10) and Proposition 2, I assume that the buyers also has just one
intermediate good as input. In a general framework, the customer firms may have more than one
intermediate input and, as a result, decide about the evasion of each input separately. Before studying
the general case, assume that there is one downstream which buys two differentiated inputs from
two upstream activities 1 and 2 and it can over-report the purchases of either 1 or 2.
The government draws the shares µ1 and µ2 input credit invoices of the two commodities and all
firms take the total number of invoices N1 and N2 as given. In this case, the optimization problem for
the upstream firms are the same as (6), but the probability of not being detected for the downstream
is (1 − k1/N1)n1(1 − k2/N2)n2 . Since N1, N2 are large it can be approximated by 1 − µ1k1 − µ2k2.














































b2) ≤ 0 (14)
To have nonnegative edb1 and e
d





. In this case, at the optimum,



























, the two FOC yield the same result eb1 = eb2 which means d is indifferent between
the two commodities and we have edb1 + e
d
b1 = eb1






dmax[eb1, eb2] + δ(µ1N1 + µ2N2) (15)
According to Proposition 2, at the government’s optimum, µi is an increasing function of the number
of evading firms. Besides, Proposition 1 indicates that for each commodity i, eb is a strictly decreasing
function of µi. Therefore, when the tax authority sets its policy from Proposition 2, we can write
the equilibrium misreporting of intermediate good i as
ebi = hi(Mi) (16)
where hi(.) is a decreasing function of Mi, the total number of firms that misreport the commodity
i. If ∃ i ∈ {1, 2} such that hi(Mui +Md) > hj(Muj ), then µ1 and µ2 are determined independently












such that eb1 = eb2. In the general setting, the formulation of optimal policy is
obtained in the same way.
Proposition 3. Consider a downstream activity that uses J different intermediate goods as input.
Derive the minimum number j ∈ {1, . . . , J} that can separate the goods into two mutually exclusive














In addition, ∀q ∈ Qj, the downstream misreporting for commodity q is zero and the optimal policy
is determined from Proposition 2, given the number of other traders.
Proof. Appendix A.4.
Proposition 3 provides the optimal policy of the government when a downstream activity has
multiple inputs. At the optimal equilibrium, these conditions hold in all downstream activities that
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have multiple intermediate commodities as inputs. The optimal decision of a firm in such activities is
over-reporting the input(s) that has the lowest cross-checking probability. Therefore, the government
should allocate cross-checking rates across commodities such that a single commodity does not attract
a large share of firms for misreporting. This suggests that commodities that are the input of a lot
of other activities and have a lot of traders should be under more cross-checking than others. Here,
for simplicity, I assumed that each activity produces just one commodity, but may use a number of
inputs. In a general setting, if suppliers also have a number of products to sell, the authority should
take into account that they can also switch between different products for evasion in the form of
under-reporting the sales. Then, Proposition 3 should be extended to the case that sellers can also
choose which output to under-report.
4.1.2 Objective versus subjective costs of fraud
So far, I discussed the role of sectoral characteristics on firm’s evasion and the assumptions about
cost of detection in (5) just reflect the financial costs for a risk-neutral taxpayer. This is a reasonable
assumption to formulate the optimal cross-checking policy where the tax authority deals with invoices
not firms. For finding optimal visiting audit rate, however, the type of the taxpayer also plays an
important role in determining the expected return of the auditing case. In practice, taxpayers
usually do not have similar impressions about the cost of evasion and their subjective views about
risk, reputation, and social norms differentiates their attitudes toward tax fraud (Andreoni et al.,
1998). For some people, conviction for tax evasion is unimaginable due to fear of social stigma or
damage of reputation, but a habitual criminal may think about it just as a worst case scenario. In
the model, the subjective characteristics of a firm are reflected in its cost function θ(.), in the sense
that the convexity of the function is higher for risk-averse taxpayers. In order to specify a measure
for the subjective costs, first, I find evasion as a function of factors that are exogenous for firms.
Lemma 1. In the presence of invoice cross-checking, we can write ec = g(
yc
λ
) , where g : R+ → R+




According to Section 3, the cost of fraud is always a convex function and this makes ec a strictly
concave function of yc/λ. Therefore, taxpayers are heterogeneous in two dimensions: One is yc which
reflects the possibility of evasion; another is g(.) which reflects the subjective costs of each taxpayer.
So far, I assumed the same θ(.) –and thus g(.)– for all taxpayers, but hereafter, I add the possibility
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of different functional forms to capture psychological and cultural aspects of taxpayers such as risk
aversion, tax morale, patriotism, guilt, and shame. The curvature of θ(.) and consequently g(.) help
to characterize these subjective beliefs for each taxpayer. In order to measure the curvature, I use
the conventional index of relative risk aversion (RRA).12 Specifically, consider ec as the utility of
the firm and yc/λ as asset –which here is the possibility of evasion– then γ(x) = −xg′′(x)/g′(x) is
the relative risk aversion of the taxpayer toward VAT fraud: The more curved the function g(.) is,
the lower will be a its certainty equivalent of a risky bundle. In the next part, I use this concept to
determine the optimal visiting audit rate for the government.
4.1.3 Optimal audit rate and taxpayers’ subjective beliefs
In order to find the optimal visiting audit λ in each cluster, the authority seeks to minimize evasion
in sales to final consumers given visiting audit is costly. Therefore, the optimization problem is
min
λs
esc + ηλs (17)
where λs is the rate of visiting audit in cluster s, η is the cost of auditing one firm,
13 and esc is the




Thus, the audit rate should be adjusted at the level that the marginal reduction in the evasion of a
firm is equal to the (shadow) cost of auditing. This means that at the optimum marginal reduction
in the evasion is the same in all clusters.
One important issue for the policymakers is how to overcome information asymmetries to estimate
esc. Based on Lemma 1, ec depends on yc and g(.), therefore to find e
s
c, the tax authority needs an
estimation of those parameters for each firm. The size of sales to final consumer is easier to estimate
and can be found by checking the information on bank accounts and location as well as the type
of activity (for instance the bulk of costumers of a retailer or a barber shop are final consumers).
To estimate the heterogeneity of taxpayers in terms of risk-aversion and other subjective factors, a
growing literature proposes the use of predictive analytics (Hashimzade et al., 2014). This type of
12Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) indicate that tax evasion is akin to the choice of how much to gamble. Each unit of
misreporting the VAT offers a payoff but may lead to a penalty.
13An equivalent assumption about cost of auditing is assuming the tax agency is able to audit a limited number of
firms and η is the Lagrange multiplier or the shadow cost of a single audit.
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analysis provides a set of tools to use historical data to predict future outcomes and create a consistent
risk ranking of taxpayers. There are a number of factors that help the authority to estimate the
subjective cost of taxpayers. According to the evidence in section 2, evasion is a concave function
of firm’s size suggesting a negative relationship between size and relative risk aversion. The bigger
firms usually have numerous employees and often hire external accountants that might mistakenly
report the evasion or make a rational whistle-blowing (Kleven et al., 2009). Therefore, the collusion
for hiding the evasion breaks easier in a big firm rather than a small one with limited workers,
resulting more risk-aversion for bigger firms. The second factor to estimate the cost function is the
age of the firm (Feinstein, 1991). Often, younger firms are more likely to evade tax, because at the
early stages the enterprise faces more financial constraints and moreover may not be precisely aware
about tax rules. The ownership of the firm is another factor to predict the cost of evasion. The
entrepreneurial enterprises, run by the owner, are more likely to evade tax rather than managerial
enterprises that have an external manager (Egger et al., 2014). Gender and education of the taxpayer
has been revealed to be the other significant determinants of tax evasion. Kastlunger et al. (2010)
show that the tax compliance of females are normally higher than males. Witte and Woodbury
(1985) find a negative association between the general education level of taxpayers and tax evasion.
The occupational choice, social networks, past behavior and compliance reputation of taxpayers are
other factors revealing the risk behavior of firms (Hashimzade et al., 2014). Define ysc and gs(.) as
the estimated value of tax obligation on sales to final consumers and the functional form of g(.) in
cluster s. Then, the following proposition shows how the level of audit rate depends on subjective
characteristics.
Proposition 4. In the presence of invoice cross-checking, if λs is the optimal choice of the govern-






























Proposition 4 indicates that the relationship between the optimal audit rate and final consumption
of a cluster depends on the relative risk-aversion of taxpayer to evade ec defined as γs. When the
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relative risk-aversion in increasing in yc/λ, it means that when the taxpayer experiences an increase
in the possibility of evasion, he chooses to decrease the share of evasion in total tax obligation on
final consumptions. Figure 2, illustrates the optimal audit rate for two different functional forms of








and therefore graphically find the optimal audit rate in each point. The slopes of the tangent lines
reflect g′(ysc/λs) and the distance from the vertical axis is y
s
c/λs. Thus, ηλs, the multiplication of
the two, is the height of the triangle they shape. The below curve with an asymptote stands for
higher relative risk aversion and at the optimum has smaller audit rate. The horizontal asymptote
in g(.) corresponds to a vertical asymptote in the cost function θ. As mentioned in Section 3, many
countries have implemented harsh penalties for big tax frauds and from one angle, the asymptote in
the cost function can represent the level of evasion in which the defrauder is convicted to long-term
imprisonment or life in prison. However, from different viewpoint, it reflects the subjective beliefs of
compliant taxpayers who never imagine evasion more than the asymptote due to high risk aversion
or fear of social stigma. In the next step, I characterize the relationship between λs and y
s
c based on










Figure 2: Optimal audit rate for two asymptotic and non-asymptotic cost functions.





λs = 0, lim
ysc→0






Lemma 2 shows when ysc is near zero, λs is zero but its derivative is +∞. In this neighborhood
the relationship between λ and ysc is independent of γs. However, for a larger level of yc, the
relationship becomes very sensitive to the relative risk aversion of taxpayers. Using Proposition 3,
we can distinguish between four different cases:
1. low risk aversion (γs < 1): λs is increasing in y
s
c .
2. medium risk aversion (γs = 1): λs is constant in y
s
c .
3. high risk aversion (1 < γs < 2): λs is decreasing in y
s
c .
4. very high risk aversion (γs ≥ 2): λs = 0 and esc is equal to its horizontal asymptote.
For any form of g(.) that satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1, at ysc = 0 the relative risk aversion is
zero, but it can change at higher level of ysc . For better interpretation, I use four different functional
forms for g(.) and show how they shape the link between λs and y
s
c . The details of calculations









and ∀x > 0, γs < 1.
Therefore, λs is an increasing function of y
s
c and for large enough amounts of y
s
c , the optimal λs
has a corner solution equal to one.14 The second example is when g(.) is a logarithmic function
g(x) = 12a ln(1 + x/a), a > 0. Here, γs =
x
x+ a
and λs is increasing in y
s





c approaches zero which means, unlike 3a, λs never reaches 1. The other two cases









. Therefore, by increasing ysc , at first λs increases, then reaches
a maximum when γs = 1 (y
s
c = aλs), and afterward, where 1 < γs < 2, it becomes decreasing.













. Similar to Figure 3c, around ysc = 0, λs is increasing, and when 1 < γs < 2,









λs drops to zero and remains constant for higher levels of y
s
c . In this case, the amount of evasion
stays equal to the horizontal asymptote of g(.) which is equal to
a
2n
. The reason of the negative
14In reality, because the cost of audit η is large, this hypothetical solution is reached in very large levels of ysc that
does not exist in practice.
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relationship between audit rate and final consumption in the last two examples is the existence of
asymptote in the cost function. Basically, no evasion is possible above the asymptote and higher














































, a > 0, n > 1
Figure 3: Government audit and firm’s final consumption. For risk neutral firms the relationship is
always positive, but for very risk averse taxpayer it may turn to be decreasing or become zero.
Figure 3 illustrates the importance of subjective beliefs of tax payers in shaping the optimal
visiting audit rate of the tax authority. Therefore, all factors mentioned above can play a role in
determining the audit rate of a firm. For instance, large taxpayers are unlikely to engage in gross
evasion to avoid hurting their reputation. Therefore, they have higher γs than smaller taxpayers.
This may lead to less optimal audit rate for them and thus, the total revenue may decline if the
audit of medium and small taxpayers is neglected. This is in contrast with the conventional wisdom
in many countries to over-allocate the audit staff in larger firms. In addition, the government
should collect information about various characteristics of the firm such as age, ownership, gender
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and eduction of the manager to have a better estimation of its risk behavior. As discussed above,
a young and entrepreneurial firm with male and uneducated manager tend to have smaller risk-
aversion. Therefore, the optimal audit policy for them can be decreasing in size of sales to final
consumers. Overall, the results of this section highlight the importance of predictive analytics in
determining audit policy.
5 Self-assessment method without invoice cross-checking
In this section, I assume that the VAT administration uses self-assessment without invoice reporting
and at each time randomly audits a share of firms. When a visiting audit takes place, all VAT
invoices are checked for correspondence and eb is revealed, but the chance of detecting ec depends
on the relative extent of the fraud and is equal to ec/yc. In this setting the optimization problem of
the firms can be written as
max
eb,ec≥0

























θ(eb + ec)− θ(eb)
)
= 1 (23)
Condition (22) indicates that, at the optimum, the marginal gain of one addition unit of eb is equal





respectively. Moreover, according to (23), ec results in two marginal costs:
one is marginal cost of the rise in the punishment which is λec/ycθ
′(eb + ec) and the other is the
marginal expected cost due to the increase in detection probability of ec. At the optimum these two
costs are equal to the marginal benefit of one additional unit of evasion.
If (21) is a concave function, then the solutions given by FOC are the optimal choice and they
maximize the objective function. However, the concavity of (21) near the critical point of FOC
depends on yc, λ and the cost function.
15Here, I implicitly assumed that the amount of tax obligation on business-to-business transactions yb is large and
imposes no restriction on eb. If the solution of eb in (21) is greater than yb, it has the corner solution eb = yb and the
optimization is just w.r.t. ec.
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Proposition 5. In the self-assessment enforcement method, if
(




2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ
′′(eb + ec)





then the optimal choices of firm for ec and eb are found using (22) and (23). Otherwise, at the
optimum, eb = 0 and ec is found from ecθ
′(ec) + θ(ec) = yc/λ.
Proof. Appendix A.9
Proposition 6 states the optimal firm’s decision for evasion. When the inequality holds, the
objective function is concave, otherwise the FOC results in a saddle point where the objective
function has maximum in one direction and minimum in the other. In this case, the best decision
of firm is reallocating the evasion from business transactions to sales to final consumers. The saddle
point solution happens when θ′′(eb) is small and yc –and as a results ec– is large. For instance, if
θ′′(0) = 0, then for small enough eb the inequality becomes (θ
′(ec)− 1)2 < 2ecθ′′(ec) which does not
hold for large enough ec. (a simple example is θ(e) = e
n + e). In such situations, the firm is better
off by being fully compliant for eb. Nevertheless, if θ
′′(0) is large enough, for a simple polynomial
or exponential cost functions, one can show that the saddle point never exists. In appendix A.11, I
analyze the inequality for different functional forms.
The optimality conditions of the firm, either if there is a maximum or a saddle point, intuitively
suggest that higher audit rate increases compliance, but more final consumption reallocates evasion
in favor of ec, increasing the overall amount. Formally, we can show that the results of Proposition
1 are valid in this context.
Proposition 6. In the self-assessment enforcement method, total evasion is increasing in transac-
tions with final consumers yc and decreasing in visiting audit rate λ.
Proof. Appendix A.10.
Proposition 6 is consistent with the evidence of the positive relationship between final consump-
tion and total evasion of a firm. Therefore, this relationship is independent of the audit method of
the government and is valid in the absence of invoice cross-checking.
5.1 Optimal audit policy
In the simple self-assessment method without cross-checking, the optimal audit rate is obtained








In this case, define es = esb + e
s





























and ζ = yscG12/G1. In general, finding the boundaries of ζ is cumbersome, however
if 0 < ζ < 1, the qualitative results in above about the effect of relative risk aversion on the link
between λ∗s and y
s
c are still valid. As a robustness check, I simulate the optimal condition for λs
using two simple quadratic and asymptotic functional forms. If θ(x) = 12x




the qualitative relationship between λs and y
s
c are similar to Figure 3a and Figure 3c respectively.
For the quadratic cost function the audit rate is monotonically increasing in final consumption, but
for the asymptotic cost function the relationship is first increasing and then overturns at a specific
point.
By comparing self-assessment method with invoice cross-checking, we can simply show that at
the same rate of visiting audit, total evasion is less or equal when invoice cross-checking is available
(see Appendix A.13). However, a more general question for policymakers is the choice between
different enforcement methods. Answering this question requires information about the fixed cost
of implementing an integrated invoice system as well as variable costs of cross-checking and visiting
audit and is not in the scope of this paper. But intuitively, we can say as new technologies reduce
the fixed costs of such system the governments are better off by utilizing it.
6 conclusion
The recent developments in tax enforcement literature highlight the importance of third party report-
ing and information technology on reducing tax fraud and evasion. Research in this field, however,
has tended to focus on direct taxes. This paper models how these two instruments can be optimally
utilized in the value-added tax which nowadays emerges as the indirect tax of choice and is adopted
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by more than 150 countries.
Using enterprise-level estimation of Indian manufacturing sector, I show that, together with the
number and size of traders, final consumption of a commodity increases the intensive margin of
VAT fraud (misreporting). This effect can be explained by the invoice system of the VAT which
raises the risk of evasion on business-to-business transaction and makes sales to final consumers
more attractive for VAT fraud. Using this variation in the detection risk, the model implies that
evasion is an increasing function of sales to final consumers and audit rate. It also shows how invoice
reporting limits the evasion on inter-firm transactions by enabling the tax authority to do random
cross-checking.
In addition to the new framework for analyzing VAT evasion, this study provides important
implications for tax authorities. First, it pinpoints how invoice cross-checking can control VAT
evasion and presents how to find its optimal rate, based on sector and commodity characteristics
such as number of traders and the level of production. Second, the findings stress the importance
of final consumption which is a sectoral characteristic, easy to measure for the policymakers. For
instance, the visiting audits should be more focused on downstream sectors and services such as
retailer shops, hotels, and restaurants. Third, the paper underlines the significance of risk-based
visiting audits and the importance of taxpayers’ subjective measures in determining their audit rate.
Since large firms are more risk-averse, total VAT revenue can diminish if the audit of medium and
small taxpayers is neglected.
Although this paper focuses on the VAT, the results can be extended to other type of taxes in
which the authority faces information with different levels of accuracy. For instance, withholding
income taxes are third-party reported and can be checked through information reporting systems.
In comparison, self-employed income tax should be investigated by visiting audits based on the
characteristics of the taxpayer.
Despite the paper adds substantially to our understanding on VAT misreporting, a number of
potential limitations need to be mentioned. The present study has only investigated one dimension
of VAT fraud and tax authorities must think about other potential evasions while implementing
their policies. Keen and Smith (2006) outline a list of VAT frauds and some practical solution. As
mentioned above, a notable fraud in developing countries is failure to register which is studied in
Hoseini (2014) in detail. The VAT also has a big potential for cross-border frauds like missing trader
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A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Relaxing the assumption of independence between invoice cross-checking
and visiting audits
If eb and ec are not independent and jointly determined, we can write the optimization problem of
a firm as the combination of (6) and (8).
max
eb,ec


























′(eb) + θ(eb)) = 1 (28)
which means that the optimal eb in this case is smaller than in (7). The FOC w.r.t. ec gives
ecθ








′′(eb + ec) + θ
′(eb + ec)− θ′(eb)
2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ′′(eb + ec)
< 0 (30)
Also because (1 + ∂ec/∂eb > 0) total evasion (eb + ec) becomes smaller. Therefore, by relaxing the
assumption of independence, we have a reduction in eb and an increase in ec in the sense that total
evasion declines.
The assumption about the separability of eb and ec in optimization is reasonable because in
practical circumstances the two problems lead to close outcomes. As mentioned above, in practice,
the variable cost of cross-checking is much less than visiting audit, therefore at the government’s
optimum µ is much larger than λ when the firm has a high share of business customers. In this case,
the answer of (28) for eb is very close to (7). On the other hand, when yb is small and yc is large,
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tax authority leaves that commodity out from cross-checking and eb in (27) is determined by corner




θ′(eb + ec) <<
1
λ or yb is small the two problems
leads to very similar results.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Define f(e) = eθ′(e) + θ(e). Then, because θ(e) is strictly increasing and convex, we have f ′(e) =



























A.3 Proof of Proposition 2






































































i ) + 1 = 0 (36)
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From the second order condition, the denominator of (38) is positive, thus because ∂eib/∂µi < 0, µi
is increasing in Ai.





)αi, then Bi is negligible relative to Ai and we can approximate the






On the other hand, when δ –cost of an additional cross-checking– is small, the level of evasion is












is a good approximation of µ2i when cost of cross-checking is low. But at most µ
can be equal to one and if δ is very small maybe cross-checking of all invoices are optimal.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
If a downstream activity uses J intermediate goods as input and over-reports k1, . . . , kJ invoices of
each input, the probability of not being detected for a firm in that activity is (1− k1/N1)n1 . . . (1−
kJ/NJ)
nJ and its approximation will be 1−
∑J
i=1 µiki. As a consequence, the optimization problem





































To have positive edb1 to e
d






. Otherwise, at least one edbi is
zero. Because each upstream activity produces just one intermediate good, its only misreporting
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possibility is on one commodity, but, d has different options for misreporting. Similar to the case
with two inputs, if ebi = max{eb1, . . . , ebJ}, the downstream firm d is better off by over-reporting
just the invoices of commodity i. However, this makes the authority to increase the cross-checking of
i, because he knows higher number of firms are misreporting on that commodity. Then, increasing
the cross-checking rate in i may make risk of other commodities smaller for d and the downstream
firms switch their misreporting to other options.
To find the equilibrium, consider the authority makes the downstream firms indifferent between j
commodities, that comprise the elements of a set Pj , for over-reporting their invoices and the rest of
J−j commodities build up the set Qj . If downstream firms have no incentive to evade on q ∈ Qj , on
average, the share 1/j of them over-report the transactions of p ∈ Pj . In this case, to find the total
number of misreporting firms, the authority adds this number to the number of the upstream firms of
each intermediate good –that have just one option for misreporting. Therefore, at the government’s
optimum, if ∀q ∈ Qj downstream evasion is zero, then ∀p ∈ Pj , we have ebp = hp(Mup + 1jM
d). On
the other hand, Pj and Qj characterize a Nash equilibrium, if downstream firms have no incentive to
switch their over-reporting from a commodity p ∈ Pj to another q ∈ Qj . This means that ∀q ∈ Qj









For Qj = ∅ we set j = J and the Nash equilibrium always exists, but (43) can hold for j < J too.
The optimal equilibrium for the authority is the one that imposes the lowest number of constraints

















mization problem, the equilibrium with the minimum j is the optimal choice of the authority. After
finding the minimum j that holds (43), the optimal policy for all p ∈ Pj is making the downstream
firms indifferent for misreporting which means






On the other hand, for all q ∈ Qj , the downstream firms never decide to misreport commodity q and
the optimal policy is determined independently from Proposition 2 considering no downstream firm
33
over-reports invoices of commodity q.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
Similar to Appendix A.2, define f(e) = eθ′(e) + θ(e), then according to (7) and (9) g(x) = f−1(x).
The first and second derivative of f are equal to
f ′(e) = 2θ′(e) + eθ′′(e) (45)
f ′′(e) = 3θ′′(e) + eθ′′′(e) (46)
because θ′ > 1 (this comes from the assumption that the penalty is always greater than evasion)
and θ′′ > 0, we have f ′(e) > 2. Moreover, according to (5), θ′′′(e) ≥ 0, and thus we have f ′′(e) > 0.








Therefore 0 < g′(x) ≤ 1
2
and θ′′′(e) ≥ 0 is the sufficient condition for g′′(x) < 0.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
First, I prove the positive relationship between optimal λs and y
s
c in the presence of cross-checking,
which is a simpler case because eb is given, then I generalize the proof for simple self-assessment











Here, firm-level evasion esc is a function of government policy λs(y
s
c) and exogenous characteristic of



















Based on Lemma 1, we can write esc = g(
ysc
λs











By differentiating w.r.t. λs and y
s










































































A.7 Proof of Lemma 2










) = 0 (56)
































A.8 Finding the derivatives of Figure 3























































































A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
By defining
e = eb + ec, θe = θ(eb + ec) θb = θ(eb)
we can obtain an alternative formulation for firm’s optimization problem
max
e≥eb≥0

























































Then, the FOC are Eb = Ee = 0, equivalent to (22) and (23). The second order condition of partial
derivatives to have a concave objective function requires
∆ = EeeEbb − E2eb > 0 (66)
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2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b
)
− (θ′e + θ′b)2 > 0 (67)





e(yc − ec)θ′′b + 2ecθ′′eθ′b + ec(yc − ec)θ′′eθ′′b − θ′2e − θ′2b > 0 (68)
θ is a convex and increasing function, thus θ′ > 0, θ′′ > 0 and θ′e > θ
′
b. In addition, from the FOC
(62), yc − ec = (θe − θb)/θ′b. Therefore (67) is equivalent to








If ∆ < 0, then the critical point is a saddle point and we have a corner solution. Since both eb
and e are positive and e ≥ eb, the corner solution that maximizes the objective function is either
eb = 0 or ec = 0 (eb = e). In each case, we have
eb = 0 : E(e, 0) = e− λθ(e) (70)
ec = 0 : E(e, e) = e− λ
e
yc
θ(e), 0 ≤ e ≤ yc (71)
By defining θ1(e) = eθ(e)/yc, we can find the optimal decision in each case using FOC













To graphically see E(e, e) < E(e, 0), the below figure illustrates the optimal choice of eb and ec when
the other is zero. Because θ(yc) = θ1(yc) the two shaded areas are equal. The payoff of firm from
each corner solution is the area below the horizontal line at 1 and the corresponding curve. It is








Hence, when ∆ < 0, the optimal choice of firm is eb = 0 and ec is found similar to (9).
A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
If ∆ < 0, then the critical point given by FOC is a saddle point which means at the optimum eb = 0
and ec is found from (9). In this case, the proof is similar to Proposition 1.











At the optimum, we have
Eb = 0, Ee = 0 (73)




















From (64), it turns out that Ebb < 0. Therefore, because ∆ > 0, we have ė < 0. By expanding (77),
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we can write the derivative of total evasion w.r.t. λ as
ėb + ėc =
yc
λ2




2 − (2θ′e + ecθ′′e )(2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b )
(78)










From (61) and (62) we obtain ∂Eb/∂yc = −λθ′b/yc and ∂Ee/∂yc = 1/yc. Then, using similar































2θ′b + (yc − ec)θ′′b
(81)
The left hand side multiplier is equal to ∆/Ebb and it is positive. The right hand side is positive if
λ < 2 + (yc − ec)θ′′b /θ′b (82)
and it always holds because 0 < λ < 1. Therefore, when ∆ > 0 we have ẽ > 0.
A.11 Analyzing different functional forms of θ in Proposition 5
Define f(x) = θ(eb) and f(y) = θ(eb + ec), then the inequality of Proposition 5 is equivalent to
(









+ 2(y − x)f ′′(y)f ′(x) (83)
To check the validity of the inequality for different functional forms, I split the problem to simpler
parts and provide example of each case. If ∀x > 0, f ′′′(x) ≤ 0, we have
(y − x)f ′′(x) ≥ f ′(y)− f ′(x) (84)
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Therefore it is sufficient to show that
(y − x)f ′′(x) ≤ f ′′(y)f(y)− f(x)
f ′(x)
(85)
which holds because f is convex and (y − x)f ′(x) ≤ f(y)− f(x)
If f ′′′(x) > 0, the inequality may violate if f ′′(0) = 0 or f is an asymptotic function, therefore I
assume in addition to other conditions f : R+ → R+ is differentiable on R+ and f ′′(0) = 1. Then,
we can rewrite (83) as















As x approaches y, the left and right hand sides approach f ′′(x)2 and +∞ respectively, and the
inequality holds. Therefore, since f and its derivative are both strictly increasing and convex, for a
fixed y if the inequality holds for the lowest possible x i.e. x = 0, it also hold when x is approaching
y. Because f(0) = 0, f ′(0) = f ′′(0) = 1, by fixing x = 0, we can expand (83) as
1 + f ′2(y)− 2f ′(y) <
(
2f ′(y) + yf ′′(y)
)
f(y) + 2yf ′′(y) (87)
which is equivalent to
β =
1 + f ′2(y)− 2f ′(y)
(2f ′(y) + yf ′′(y))f(y) + 2yf ′′(y)
< 1 (88)
The general and complete analysis of changes in β is out of the scope of this paper and here I show
it is robust on two class of convex functions that are defined on R+.
If f(x) = xn + x2/2 + x then,
f ′ = nxn−1 + x+ 1, f ′′ = n(n− 1)xn−2 + 1 (89)
(f ′ − 1)2 = n2x2n−2 + x2 + 2nxn (90)
2f ′f = 2
(
nx2n−1 + (1 + n/2)xn+1 + (n+ 1)xn + x3/3 + 3x2/2 + x
)
(91)
yf ′′f = n(n− 1)x2n−1 + (n(n− 1) + 2)xn+1/2 + n(n− 1)xn + x3/2 + x2 (92)
and one can simply show that (f ′ − 1)2 < 2f ′f + xf ′′f + 2xf ′′. For a general polynomial f(x) =
anx
n + an−1x
n−1 + · · · + x2/2 + x, we have ∀x > 1, β < 1 (proof is possible by mathematical
induction). Moreover, when the coefficients of small powers is not very larger than higher powers (e.g.
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∀i < n, ai ≤ i) then it holds in x ∈ [0, 1] as well. Similarly for exponential function f(x) = ax/ ln(a),
one can show that β < 0 always holds if ln(a) < 6, otherwise it just holds for x > 1.
A.12 The optimal audit rate in self-assessment system
Similar to above proof in section A.6, in the absence of cross-checking, when esb and e
s
c are jointly
determined, define es = esb + e
s


















G1 = −η (94)

























Therefore, from (50) the derivative of λs w.r.t. y
s


















A.13 Comparing self-assessment and invoice cross-checking methods
The equivalent problem for self-assessment when cross-checking is possible is studied in Appendix







θ′(eb + ec) + θ
′(eb)
2θ′(eb + ec) + ecθ′′(eb + ec)
> 0 (98)
One the other hand, the FOC w.r.t. eb in the two problems yield to (28) and (22). Because of
additional cost due to cross-checking, (28) gives smaller eb than (22). Hence, using (98) total evasion
is also smaller when cross-checking is available.
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B Data appendix: VAT and final consumption in UK activities
VAT revenue is drawn from VAT Statistical Factsheets, October 2009, HM Revenue & Customs
Office, UK: http://www.uktradeinfo.com. Other variables are drawn from Supply and Use Tables,
2004 - 2008, UK National Statistic, March 2011: http://www.statistics.gov.uk. All numbers
are in £Millions. The industry classifications are not exactly the same in the two sources and some
of the supply-use activities correspond to single VAT Factsheet code. Also, there are few cases that
one supply-use activity corresponds to multiple VAT factsheet code. I narrowed the non-matching
sectors down in each source, merged the single corresponding sectors together, and dropped the ones
with zero or negative VAT payments (due to zero-rating of exports). Also, I dropped beverages and













Forestry and logging 35 321 210 884
Manufacture of textiles 195 2609 14372 23538
Manufacture of wearing apparel 154 1385 33729 40067
Manufacture of leather and related products 26 491 7804 11221
Manufacture of wood, wood products and cork, except furniture 359 2671 1576 10633
Manufacture of paper and paper products 515 3445 4445 24638
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 654 16031 13947 37577
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 276 5109 2242 42110
Manufacture of rubber and rubber products 757 7175 4448 31105
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 648 5173 3583 21398
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment 1430 13335 4276 41348
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 457 2839 2408 33457
Manufacture of electrical equipment 372 13982 19877 122435
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c 113 12880 9682 62961
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2295 9924 38602 97334
Manufacture of furniture 391 3954 11373 20223
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 3767 27067 28307 45076
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 442 16620 25032 66381
Sewerage 255 8388 9108 18918
Construction of buildings 4100 74619 7408 210196
Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 9286 46849 0 448
Retail trade except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 6303 62020 1753 2288
Postal and courier activities 333 8759 1013 15687
Telecommunications 2486 21806 15429 45809
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities 3649 35296 3 71168
Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding 503 60083 38208 97837
Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security 453 17058 27251 52119
Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities 177 13666 2347 29776
Real estate activities 1018 108713 113803 166621
Legal and accounting services 3811 30487 621 39243
Activities of head offices; management consultancy services 3120 15262 0 38033
Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 2031 20610 327 40063
Scientific research and development 9 4947 327 12291
Advertising and market research 602 6491 82 23690
Other professional, scientific and technical activities 333 42198 1980 104594
Veterinary activities 138 65621 102655 114886
Rental and leasing activities 662 12104 7201 28376
Education 412 68926 77056 99472
Residential care activities 41 5273 5273 5285
Social work activities without accommodation 31 20344 32148 49576
Sports activities and amusement and recreation activities 1668 32348 39444 67386
Activities of membership organisations 213 7072 6053 10107
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